パリ協定
Paris Agreement/ja
Condition | UNFCCC締約国の55%が批准・加入し、世界の温室効果ガス排出量の55%を占めること |
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パリ協定(パリ合意またはパリ気候協定とも呼ばれる)は、2016年に署名された気候変動に関する国際条約である。この条約は、気候変動の緩和、適応、および資金を対象としている。パリ協定は、パリ近郊のフランスで開催された2015年国連気候変動会議で196の締約国によって交渉された。2023年2月現在、国連気候変動枠組条約(UNFCCC)の195の加盟国が協定の締約国である。協定を批准していないUNFCCC加盟3カ国のうち、唯一の主要な排出国はイランである。2番目に大きな排出国である米国は、2020年に協定から脱退し、2021年に再加入し、2025年に再び脱退すると発表した。
パリ協定には、世界の地表温度の上昇を産業革命以前のレベルから2 °C (3.6 °F)をはるかに下回るように維持するという長期的な温度目標がある。この条約はまた、好ましくは増加の制限を1.5 °C (2.7 °F)のみにするべきであると述べている。これらの制限は、長年にわたって測定された地球の平均気温として定義されている。
気温の上昇が低いほど、気候変動の影響は小さいと予想される。この温度目標を達成するためには、温室効果ガス排出量をできるだけ早く、できるだけ多く削減する必要がある。21世紀半ばまでには実質ゼロに到達する必要がある。地球温暖化を1.5℃未満に抑えるためには、2030年までに排出量を約50%削減する必要がある。この数字は、各国の文書化された公約を考慮に入れている。パリ協定が署名された後も、世界の排出量は減少するどころか増加し続けている。2024年は記録上最も暑い年であり、世界の平均気温は1.5℃以上上昇した。
この条約は、各国が気候変動の影響に適応し、十分な資金を動員するのを助けることを目的としている。協定の下で、各国は自国の貢献を決定し、計画し、定期的に報告しなければならない。特定の排出目標を設定することを国に強制するメカニズムはないが、各目標は以前の目標を超えるべきである。1997年の京都議定書とは対照的に、先進国と途上国の区別は曖昧になり、後者も排出削減計画を提出しなければならない。
パリ協定は、2016年4月22日(アースデイ)にニューヨークの国連本部での式典で署名のために開放された。欧州連合が協定を批准した後、十分な数の国が世界の温室効果ガスの十分な量を占める協定を批准し、協定は2016年11月4日に発効した。
世界の指導者たちはこの協定を賞賛している。しかし、一部の環境保護主義者やアナリストは、厳格ではないと批判しており、その有効性については議論がある。パリ協定の下での公約は、設定された温度目標を達成するには不十分であるが、野心を高めるメカニズムが存在する。パリ協定は、2010年代後半に気候訴訟で成功裏に使用され、国や石油会社に気候変動対策を強化するよう強制している。
目的
協定の目的は、第2条に記載されているように、気候変動の危険性に対してより強力な対応をすることである。気候変動に関する国際連合枠組条約の実施を以下の方法で強化することを目指している。
(a) 世界の平均気温上昇を産業革命以前の水準から2℃をはるかに下回る水準に抑え、1.5℃に抑える努力を追求すること。これは気候変動のリスクと影響を大幅に軽減することを認識する。
(b) 食料生産を脅かさない方法で、気候変動の悪影響に適応する能力を高め、気候変動に対するレジリエンスと低温室効果ガス排出型開発を促進すること。
(c) 資金の流れを、低温室効果ガス排出と気候変動に強い開発への道筋と整合させること。
各国はさらに、「温室効果ガス排出量の世界的なピークをできるだけ早く」達成することを目指している。
進展

リードアップ
1992年の地球サミットで採択された国連気候変動枠組条約(UNFCCC)は、この分野における最初の国際条約の一つである。同条約は、締約国が気候変動に対処するため、締約国会議(COP)で定期的に会合を開くべきであると規定している。これは将来の気候協定の基礎を形成する。
1997年に採択された京都議定書は、2008年から2012年までの限定された国々の温室効果ガス削減を規制した。議定書は2012年のドーハ修正案によって2020年まで延長された。米国は、主にその法的拘束力がある性質のために、議定書を批准しないことを決定した。このことと、分配に関する対立が、その後の国際的な気候交渉の失敗につながった。2009年の交渉は京都の後継条約を生み出すことを意図していたが、交渉は決裂し、結果として生まれたコペンハーゲン合意は法的拘束力がなく、普遍的に採択されなかった。
この合意は、パリ協定のボトムアップアプローチの枠組みを築いた。UNFCCC事務局長クリスティアナ・フィゲレスのリーダーシップの下、コペンハーゲンの失敗後、交渉は勢いを盛り返した。2011年国連気候変動会議では、2020年以降の気候変動緩和措置を規定する法的文書を交渉するためにダーバン・プラットフォームが設立された。このプラットフォームは、IPCCの第5次評価報告書とUNFCCCの補助機関の作業から情報を得るというマンデートを持っていた。結果として得られる合意は2015年に採択されることになっていた。
交渉と採用

パリでの交渉は2週間にわたって行われ、最後の3夜間も継続された。その前年には様々な草案や提案が議論され、整理されてきた。ある評論家によると、フランスが成功の可能性を高めた2つの方法は、第一に約束草案(INDCs)が交渉開始前に完了していることを確実にすること、第二に会議の冒頭のみにリーダーを招待することであった。
交渉は、米国法務チームが土壇場で「shall」(しなければならない)ではなく「should」(すべきである)が承認されたことを認識し、先進国が法的に排出量削減を義務付けられることになるため、たった一語で失敗しそうになった。フランスはこれを「誤植」として変更することで問題を解決した。COP21(第21回締約国会議)の終わりに、2015年12月12日、パリ協定の最終文言は、UNFCCCに参加する195の加盟国と欧州連合のコンセンサスによって採択された。ニカラグアは、協定の弱さを非難して採択に反対したかったが、機会を与えられなかったと表明した。協定において、加盟国は「できるだけ早く」炭素排出量を削減し、地球温暖化を「2℃をはるかに下回る」(3.6°F)に抑えるために最善を尽くすことを約束した。
署名と発効
パリ協定は、2016年4月22日から2017年4月21日まで、ニューヨークの国連本部で、UNFCCC(条約)の締約国である国家および地域経済統合機関による署名のために開放された。協定への署名は批准への第一歩であるが、署名せずに協定に加入することも可能である。これにより、締約国は条約の目標に反する行為を行わない義務を負う。2016年4月1日、世界の排出量のほぼ40%を占める米国と中国は、パリ気候協定に署名することを確認した。協定は、署名のために開放された初日に175の締約国(174の国家と欧州連合)によって署名された。2021年3月現在、194の国家と欧州連合が協定に署名している。

本協定は、世界の温室効果ガス排出量の少なくとも55%(2015年に作成されたリストによる)を排出する55カ国が批准またはその他の方法で条約に参加した場合に発効する(したがって完全に効力を持つ)。条約に参加する代替方法は、受諾、承認、または加入である。最初の2つは通常、国家元首が国を条約に拘束する必要がない場合に使用され、後者は通常、国が既に発効している条約に参加する場合に発生する。欧州連合による批准後、本協定は2016年11月4日に発効するために十分な締約国を獲得した。
[:en:European Union|EU]]とその加盟国は両者とも、パリ協定の批准に対して個別に責任を負う。EUとその28の加盟国が同時に批准することで、厳密に他方に属する義務を負わないようにすることを強く望む声が報告されており、EU全体の削減目標に対する各加盟国の分担をめぐる意見の相違や、英国のEU離脱投票がパリ協定を遅らせるのではないかという懸念がオブザーバーからあった。しかし、EUは2016年10月5日に、7つのEU加盟国とともに批准書を寄託した。
当事者

批准または加入した国
EUと194の国々が協定を批准または加入しており、これは温室効果ガス排出量の98%以上を占める。批准していない国は、中東の温室効果ガス排出国の一部であり、世界全体の2%を占めるイランが最大である。リビアとイエメンも協定を批准していない。エリトリアは、2023年2月7日に協定を批准した最新の国である。
第28条により、締約国は寄託者に脱退通知を送付した後、協定から脱退することができる。通知は、協定がその国で発効してから3年以前に行うことはできない。脱退は、寄託者に通知された後1年で発効する。
アメリカ合衆国の脱退、再加入、再脱退
2017年8月4日、トランプ政権は、米国が、中国に次ぐ世界第2位の温室効果ガス排出国として、パリ協定から脱退する意向であることを国連に正式に通知した。米国政府は、国連事務総長に通知書を寄託し、1年後の2020年11月4日に正式に脱退した。
ジョー・バイデン大統領は、就任初日である2021年1月20日に、米国をパリ協定に再加入させるための大統領令に署名した。第21条3項で定められた30日間の期間を経て、米国は協定に再加入した。米国気候変動特使ジョン・ケリーはオンラインイベントに参加し、米国はパリプロセスの正当性を「取り戻す」と述べた。国連事務総長アントニオ・グテーレスは、米国の復帰を「全体を弱めていた失われた環」を回復するものとして歓迎した。
2025年1月20日、ドナルド・トランプ大統領は、再び米国を協定から脱退させる大統領令に署名した。
Content
Structure
The Paris Agreement is a short agreement with 16 introductory paragraphs and 29 articles. It contains procedural articles (covering, for example, the criteria for its entry into force) and operational articles (covering, for example, mitigation, adaptation and finance). It is a binding agreement, but many of its articles do not imply obligations or are there to facilitate international collaboration. It covers most greenhouse gas emissions, but does not apply to international aviation and shipping, which fall under the responsibility of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.
The Paris Agreement has been described as having a bottom-up structure, as its core pledge and review mechanism allows nations to set their own nationally determined contributions (NDCs), rather than having targets imposed top down. Unlike its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which sets commitment targets that have legal force, the Paris Agreement, with its emphasis on consensus building, allows for voluntary and nationally determined targets. The specific climate goals are thus politically encouraged, rather than legally bound. Only the processes governing the reporting and review of these goals are mandated under international law. This structure is especially notable for the United States – because there are no legal mitigation or finance targets, the agreement is considered an "executive agreement rather than a treaty". Because the UNFCCC treaty of 1992 received the consent of the US Senate, this new agreement does not require further legislation.
Another key difference between the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol is their scope. The Kyoto Protocol differentiated between Annex-I, richer countries with a historical responsibility for climate change, and non-Annex-I countries, but this division is blurred in the Paris Agreement as all parties are required to submit emissions reduction plans. The Paris Agreement still emphasizes the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities – the acknowledgement that different nations have different capacities and duties to climate action – but it does not provide a specific division between developed and developing nations.
Nationally determined contributions

Countries determine themselves what contributions they should make to achieve the aims of the treaty. As such, these plans are called nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Article 3 requires NDCs to be "ambitious efforts" towards "achieving the purpose of this Agreement" and to "represent a progression over time". The contributions should be set every five years and are to be registered by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Each further ambition should be more ambitious than the previous one, known as the principle of progression. Countries can cooperate and pool their nationally determined contributions. The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions pledged during the 2015 Climate Change Conference are converted to NDCs when a country ratifies the Paris Agreement, unless they submit an update.
The Paris Agreement does not prescribe the exact nature of the NDCs. At a minimum, they should contain mitigation provisions, but they may also contain pledges on adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency. Some of the pledges in the NDCs are unconditional, but others are conditional on outside factors such as getting finance and technical support, the ambition from other parties or the details of rules of the Paris Agreement that are yet to be set. Most NDCs have a conditional component.
While the NDCs themselves are not binding, the procedures surrounding them are. These procedures include the obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs, set a new one every five years, and provide information about the implementation. There is no mechanism to force a country to set a NDC target by a specific date, nor to meet their targets. There will be only a name and shame system or as János Pásztor, the former U.N. assistant secretary-general on climate change, stated, a "name and encourage" plan.
Global stocktake
Under the Paris Agreement, countries must increase their ambition every five years. To facilitate this, the agreement established the Global Stocktake, which assesses progress, with the first evaluation in 2023. The outcome is to be used as input for new nationally determined contributions of parties. The Talanoa Dialogue in 2018 was seen as an example for the global stocktake. After a year of discussion, a report was published and there was a call for action, but countries did not increase ambition afterwards.
The stocktake works as part of the Paris Agreement's effort to create a "ratcheting up" of ambition in emissions cuts. Because analysts agreed in 2014 that the NDCs would not limit rising temperatures below 2 °C, the global stocktake reconvenes parties to assess how their new NDCs must evolve so that they continually reflect a country's "highest possible ambition". While ratcheting up the ambition of NDCs is a major aim of the global stocktake, it assesses efforts beyond mitigation. The five-year reviews will also evaluate adaptation, climate finance provisions, and technology development and transfer.
On November 30, 2023, the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) commenced in Dubai with renewed calls for amplified efforts towards climate action.
Mitigation provisions and carbon markets
Article 6 has been flagged as containing some of the key provisions of the Paris Agreement. Broadly, it outlines the cooperative approaches that parties can take in achieving their nationally determined carbon emissions reductions. In doing so, it helps establish the Paris Agreement as a framework for a global carbon market. Article 6 is the only important part of the agreement yet to be resolved; negotiations in 2019 did not produce a result. The topic was settled during the 2021 COP26 in Glasgow. A mechanism, the "corresponding adjustment", was established to avoid double counting for emission offsets.
Linkage of carbon trading systems and ITMOs
Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 establish a framework to govern the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). The agreement recognizes the rights of parties to use emissions reductions outside of their own borders toward their NDC, in a system of carbon accounting and trading. This provision requires the "linkage" of carbon emissions trading systems – because measured emissions reductions must avoid "double counting", transferred mitigation outcomes must be recorded as a gain of emission units for one party and a reduction of emission units for the other, a so-called "corresponding adjustment". Because the NDCs, and domestic carbon trading schemes, are heterogeneous, the ITMOs will provide a format for global linkage under the auspices of the UNFCCC. The provision thus also creates a pressure for countries to adopt emissions management systems – if a country wants to use more cost-effective cooperative approaches to achieve their NDCs, they will have to monitor carbon units for their economies.
So far, as the only country who wants to buy ITMOs, Switzerland has signed deals regarding ITMO tradings with Peru, Ghana, Senegal, Georgia, Dominica, Vanuatu, Thailand and Ukraine.
Country | Sign date | Source |
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Peru | 20 October 2020 | |
Ghana | 23 November 2020 | |
Senegal | 6 July 2021 | |
Georgia | 18 October 2021 | |
Dominica | 11 November 2021 | |
Vanuatu | 11 November 2021 | |
Thailand | 24 June 2022 | |
Ukraine | 4 July 2022 |
Sustainable Development Mechanism
Paragraphs 6.4–6.7 establish a mechanism "to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gases and support sustainable development". Though there is no official name for the mechanism as yet, it has been referred to as the Sustainable Development Mechanism or SDM. The SDM is considered to be the successor to the Clean Development Mechanism, a mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol by which parties could collaboratively pursue emissions reductions.
The SDM is set to largely resemble the Clean Development Mechanism, with the dual goal of contributing to global GHG emissions reductions and supporting sustainable development. Though the structure and processes governing the SDM are not yet determined, certain similarities and differences from the Clean Development Mechanisms have become clear. A key difference is that the SDM will be available to all parties as opposed to only Annex-I parties, making it much wider in scope.
The Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol was criticized for failing to produce either meaningful emissions reductions or sustainable development benefits in most instances. and for its complexity. It is possible that the SDM will see difficulties.
Climate change adaptation provisions
Climate change adaptation received more focus in Paris negotiations than in previous climate treaties. Collective, long-term adaptation goals are included in the agreement, and countries must report on their adaptation actions, making it a parallel component with mitigation The adaptation goals focus on enhancing adaptive capacity, increasing resilience, and limiting vulnerability.
Implementation
The Paris Agreement is implemented via national policy. It would involve improvements to energy efficiency to decrease the energy intensity of the global economy. Implementation also requires fossil fuel burning to be cut back and the share of sustainable energy to grow rapidly. Emissions are being reduced rapidly in the electricity sector, but not in the building, transport and heating sector. Some industries are difficult to decarbonize, and for those carbon dioxide removal may be necessary to achieve net zero emissions. In a report released in 2022 the IPCC promotes the need for innovation and technological changes in combination with consumption and production behavioral changes to meet Paris Agreement objectives.
To stay below 1.5 °C of global warming, emissions need to be cut by roughly 50% by 2030. This is an aggregate of each country's nationally determined contributions. By mid-century, CO
2 emissions would need to be cut to zero, and total greenhouse gases would need to be net zero just after mid-century.
There are barriers to implementing the agreement. Some countries struggle to attract the finance necessary for investments in decarbonization. Climate finance is fragmented, further complicating investments. Another issue is the lack of capabilities in government and other institutions to implement policy. Clean technology and knowledge is often not transferred to countries or places that need it. In December 2020, the former chair of the COP 21, Laurent Fabius, argued that the implementation of the Paris Agreement could be bolstered by the adoption of a Global Pact for the Environment. The latter would define the environmental rights and duties of states, individuals and businesses.
Specific topics of concern
Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the Paris Agreement to reach its climate goals is under debate, with most experts saying it is insufficient for its more ambitious goal of keeping global temperature rise under 1.5 °C. Many of the exact provisions of the Paris Agreement have yet to be straightened out, so that it may be too early to judge effectiveness. According to the 2020 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), with the current climate commitments of the Paris Agreement, global mean temperatures will likely rise by more than 3 °C by the end of the 21st century. Newer net zero commitments were not included in the Nationally Determined Contributions, and may bring down temperatures by a further 0.5 °C.
With initial pledges by countries inadequate, faster and more expensive future mitigation would be needed to still reach the targets. Furthermore, there is a gap between pledges by countries in their NDCs and implementation of these pledges; one third of the emission gap between the lowest-costs and actual reductions in emissions would be closed by implementing existing pledges. A pair of studies in Nature found that as of 2017 none of the major industrialized nations were implementing the policies they had pledged, and none met their pledged emission reduction targets, and even if they had, the sum of all member pledges (as of 2016) would not keep global temperature rise "well below 2°C".
In 2021, a study using a probabilistic model concluded that the rates of emissions reductions would have to increase by 80% beyond NDCs to likely meet the 2 °C upper target of the Paris Agreement, that the probabilities of major emitters meeting their NDCs without such an increase is very low. It estimated that with current trends the probability of staying below 2 °C of warming is 5–26% if NDCs were met and continued post-2030 by all signatories.
2020年現在[update], there is little scientific literature on the topics of the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement on capacity building and adaptation, even though they feature prominently in the Paris Agreement. The literature available is mostly mixed in its conclusions about loss and damage, and adaptation.
According to the stocktake report, the agreement has a significant effect: while in 2010 the expected temperature rise by 2100 was 3.7–4.8 °C, at COP 27 it was 2.4–2.6 °C and if all countries will fulfill their long-term pledges even 1.7–2.1 °C. Despite it, the world is still very far from reaching the aim of the agreement: limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. For doing this, emissions must peak by 2025.< Recent work – on the basis of the first single calendar year in 2024 with an average temperature above 1.5 degrees Celsius – indicates that most probably Earth has already entered the 20-year period that will reach an average warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the global mean temperature may have already passed the 1.5 degrees Celsius level in 2024.
The Paris Agreement also seemed to have influenced the focus of the following IPCC reports. Before the Paris Agreement was settled, the IPCC assessment reports focused roughly in equal proportions on temperatures above and below 2 °C. However, in the 6th assessment report, after the Paris Engagement was reached, slightly less than 20% of the temperature mentions are above 2 °C and almost 50% focus on 1.5 °C alone.
Fulfillment of requirements

2 emissions in China and the rest of the world have surpassed the output of the United States and Europe.

2 at a far faster rate than other primary regions.
In September 2021, the Climate Action Tracker estimated that, with current policies, global emissions will double above the 2030 target level. The gap is 20–23 Gt CO2e. Countries such as Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Thailand have been criticised of not doing enough to meet the requirements of the agreement, and are on track to achieve a 4 °C warming of the planet if current policies are implemented more widely. Of the world's countries, only the Gambia's emissions are at the level required by the Paris Agreement. Models predicted that if the necessary measures were not implemented by autumn 2021, the global average temperature would rise by 2.9 °C. With the implementation of the Paris Agreement pledges, the average temperature would rise by 2.4 °C, and with every zero emission target reached, the average temperature would rise by 2.0 °C.
The Production Gap 2021 report states that world governments still plan to produce 110% more fossil fuels in 2030 (including 240% more coal, 57% more oil and 71% more gas) than the 1.5 degree limit.
In September 2023 the first global stocktake report about the implementation of the agreement was released. According to the report contrarily to expectations, the agreement has a significant effect: while in 2010 the expected temperature rise by 2100 was 3.7–4.8 °C, at COP 27 it was 2.4–2.6 °C and if all countries will fulfill their long-term pledges 1.7–2.1 °C. However, the world remains very far from limiting warming to 1.5 degrees. To meet this benchmark, global emissions must peak by 2025, and although emissions have peaked in some countries, global emissions have not.
Ensuring finance

Developed countries reaffirmed the commitment to mobilize $100 billion a year in climate finance by 2020, and agreed to continue mobilising finance at this level until 2025. The money is for supporting mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. It includes finance for the Green Climate Fund, which is a part of the UNFCCC, but also for a variety of other public and private pledges. The Paris Agreement states that a new commitment of at least $100 billion per year has to be agreed before 2025.
Though both mitigation and adaptation require increased climate financing, adaptation has typically received lower levels of support and has mobilized less action from the private sector. A report by the OECD found that 16% of global climate finance was directed toward climate adaptation in 2013–2014, compared to 77% for mitigation. The Paris Agreement called for a balance of climate finance between adaptation and mitigation, and specifically increasing adaptation support for parties most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including Least developed countries and Small Island Developing States. The agreement also reminds parties of the importance of public grants, because adaptation measures receive less investment from the public sector.
In 2015, twenty Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and members of the International Development Finance Club introduced five principles to maintain widespread climate action in their investments: commitment to climate strategies, managing climate risks, promoting climate smart objectives, improving climate performance and accounting for their own actions. As of January 2020, the number of members abiding by these principles grew to 44.
Some specific outcomes of the elevated attention to adaptation financing in Paris include the G7 countries' announcement to provide US$420 million for climate risk insurance, and the launching of a Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) Initiative. The largest donors to multilateral climate funds, which includes the Green Climate Fund, are the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France and Sweden.
Loss and damage
It is not possible to adapt to all effects of climate change: even in the case of optimal adaptation, severe damage may still occur. The Paris Agreement recognizes loss and damage of this kind. Loss and damage can stem from extreme weather events, or from slow-onset events such as the loss of land to sea level rise for low-lying islands. Previous climate agreements classified loss and damage as a subset of adaptation.
The push to address loss and damage as a distinct issue in the Paris Agreement came from the Alliance of Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries, whose economies and livelihoods are most vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. The Warsaw Mechanism, established two years earlier during COP19 and set to expire in 2016, categorizes loss and damage as a subset of adaptation, which was unpopular with many countries. It is recognized as a separate pillar of the Paris Agreement. The United States argued against this, possibly worried that classifying the issue as separate from adaptation would create yet another climate finance provision. In the end, the agreement calls for "averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage" but specifies that it cannot be used as the basis for liability. The agreement adopts the Warsaw Mechanism, an institution that will attempt to address questions about how to classify, address, and share responsibility for loss.
Transparency
The parties are legally bound to have their progress tracked by technical expert review to assess achievement toward the NDC and to determine ways to strengthen ambition. Article 13 of the Paris Agreement articulates an "enhanced transparency framework for action and support" that establishes harmonized monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements. Both developed and developing nations must report every two years on their mitigation efforts, and all parties will be subject to technical and peer review.
While the enhanced transparency framework is universal, the framework is meant to provide "built-in flexibility" to distinguish between developed and developing countries' capacities. The Paris Agreement has provisions for an enhanced framework for capacity building, recognizes the varying circumstances of countries, and notes that the technical expert review for each country consider that country's specific capacity for reporting. Parties to the agreement send their first Biennial Transparency Report (BTR), and greenhouse gas inventory figures to the UNFCCC by 2024 and every two years after that. Developed countries submit their first BTR in 2022 and inventories annually from that year. The agreement also develops a Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency to assist developing countries in building the necessary institutions and processes for compliance.
Flexibility can be incorporated into the enhanced transparency framework via the scope, level of detail, or frequency of reporting, tiered based on a country's capacity. The requirement for in-country technical reviews could be lifted for some less developed or small island developing countries. Ways to assess capacity include financial and human resources in a country necessary for NDC review.
Litigation
The Paris Agreement has become a focal point of climate change litigation. One of the first major cases in this area was State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, which was raised against the Netherlands' government after it had reduced its planned emissions reductions goal for 2030 prior to the Paris Agreement. After an initial ruling against the government in 2015 that required it to maintain its planned reduction, the decision was upheld on appeals through the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 2019, ruling that the Dutch government failed to uphold human rights under Dutch law and the European Convention on Human Rights by lowering its emission targets. The 2 °C temperature target of the Paris Agreement provided part of the judgement's legal basis. The agreement, whose goals are enshrined in German law, also formed part of the argumentation in Neubauer et al. v. Germany, where the court ordered Germany to reconsider its climate targets.
In May 2021, the district court of The Hague ruled against oil company Royal Dutch Shell in Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell. The court ruled that it must cut its global emissions by 45% from 2019 levels by 2030, as it was in violation of human rights. This lawsuit was considered the first major application of the Paris Agreement towards a corporation.
Human rights
On 4 July 2022, the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil recognized the Paris agreement as a "human rights treaty". According to the ruling of the court in Brazil it should "supersede national law". In the same month the United Nations Human Rights Council in a resolution "(A/HRC/50/L.10/Rev.1) on Human rights and climate change, adopted without a vote" called to ratify and implement the agreement and emphasized the link between stopping climate change and the right to food.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights officially recognized that "Climate change threatens the effective enjoyment of a range of human rights including those to life, water and sanitation, food, health, housing, self-determination, culture and development."
Reception
The agreement was lauded by French president François Hollande, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon and Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, called the agreement "balanced and long-lasting", and India's prime minister Narendra Modi commended the agreement's climate justice. When the agreement achieved the required signatures in October 2016, US president Barack Obama said that "Even if we meet every target, we will only get to part of where we need to go." He also stated "this agreement will help delay or avoid some of the worst consequences of climate change [and] will help other nations ratchet down their emissions over time."
Some environmentalists and analysts reacted cautiously, acknowledging the "spirit of Paris" in bringing together countries, but expressing less optimism about the pace of climate mitigation and how much the agreement could do for poorer countries. James Hansen, a former NASA scientist and leading climate change expert, voiced anger that most of the agreement consists of "promises" or aims and not firm commitments and called the Paris talks a fraud with "no action, just promises". Criticism of the agreement from those arguing against climate action has been diffuse, which may be due to the weakness of the agreement. This type of criticism typically focuses on national sovereignty and ineffectiveness of international action.
関連項目
参考資料
- Jepsen, Henrik; et al. (2021). Negotiating the Paris Agreement: The Insider Stories. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-88624-6.
- Teske, Sven; et al. (2019). Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals. Springer. ISBN 978-3-030-05842-5.
外部リンク


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